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Glamorous as truth is, it makes us modest. To the extent we are engaged in an enterprise 
that seeks some truth about the world, we quickly learn to treat our convictions along the 
way as provisional, imperfect, puny offerings to the jealous god that usually stays well 
hidden. Consider science, a paradigm example here. It’s a fine paradox, one we relish, that 
the impressive accomplishments of physical theory go hand in hand with a genuine modesty 
in the community that has achieved them. For have we not seen time and again how what 
appeared right was not, how evidence that seemed unequivocally to indicate S in fact was 
consistent with not-S? Pursuit of the truth means fidelity to certain epistemic virtues – open 
mindedness about what you presently think is not true foremost among them. And this 
translates fairly easily into a kind of receptivity or respect towards those who hold those 
views you (currently, perhaps wrongly) think wrong.      
 
In his Democracy and Moral Conflict, Robert Talisse, essentially, applies this framework to 
our moral disagreements and, more importantly, to the political conflicts such moral 
disagreements usually engender. Democracy, everybody knows, has plenty of problems, but 
perhaps no problem is more central to democracy nowadays than that of deep political 
disagreement among adherents to conflicting moral views (the term “moral” here is to be 
understood widely – any deep disagreement with an irreducible evaluative component 
relevant to that dispute will qualify). And this problem, this conflict, has at least two 
dimensions. Borrowing language from Marx, we might say it has an objective expression: 
what is the best method to determine how such doctrines might be reconciled, or barring 
that, which doctrines might prevail? And there is a more or less subjective expression too: 
how can we prevent disagreement of this kind from engendering a deep factionalism in our 
politics, a tendency to see those with whom one disagrees as one’s enemy, a possible 
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oppressor should they prevail, and so very far from something like a colleague with whom 
one respectfully disagrees in a shared enterprise? How can we prevent citizens from giving 
up on their nation and withdrawing into like-minded subgroups, or from actively rebelling 
against a nation that has embraced a conception they reject?   
 
Before getting to Talisse’s contribution, it is worth rehearsing, just a little bit, some of the 
approaches of the past. I think they can be divided into two kinds – either a theory offers an 
approach that will deliver what we might call content reconciliation, or we get a pragmatic 
justification for living with the best we can get. Rousseau offers an example of the first 
approach. Of course, we could argue back and forth all day, but when I take up the 
standpoint of the General Will, it is no longer my view I am representing; I am expressing, 
in my vote, an interpretation of what I think the general will is. To be wrong about that is 
hardly the same as having my view oppressed by another. Because the procedure reconciles 
(or perhaps more accurately, abstracts away from) the content of what would otherwise be 
conflicting views, the subjective worry, factionalism, should disappear too. Marx offers an 
even more ambitious content reconciliation theory. Because Marx thinks all moral conflict 
is merely a proxy for economic conflict, he can also reasonably believe (what no one would 
believe now) that a society in which there was no economic conflict, where everyone 
collectively owned everything, would be one in which moral conflict would also disappear 
– and so here too, the subjective worry would wither away, there being no objective state of 
affairs to feed it. And I take the pragmatic justifications – typically Anglo Saxon, we find 
them in Hume, Locke, Mill, Rawls – need little rehearsal: essentially, the argument holds 
simply that the benefits of cooperative life far outweigh the “inconveniences” of being out 
voted on this issue or that, and so, we must just reconcile ourselves to what we must not 
mind too much. I leave out Hobbes, actually, granddaddy as he may be of the pragmatic 
justification in politics, because it is not democracy Hobbes thinks he justifies with this 
awful argument (I use the word in its sixteenth century sense).  
 
It is an interesting and original feature of Talisse’s view that he offers an argument that is 
fairly easy going about the first question because it feels it offers genuine help with the 
second. We don’t need some magical (and probably bogus) story that supposedly takes 
away the actual content of our disagreement. Nor should we settle for a pragmatic argument 
that tells us just to live with these unhappy disagreements since the alternative is just so 
much worse. We need to see how our disagreement, being the sort of disagreement it is, 
commits us to a kind of respect for one another, and commitment to a process (democracy) 
that expresses that respect. And this respect and commitment should prevent withdrawal and 
rebellion too. It turns out that, precisely because we think our views true (and why would 
we hold them if we did not believe them true?) we are also committed to certain epistemic 
norms, norms that in turn have substantive political implications. As believers, we are also 
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believers in the values that support our belief – openness to evidence, willingness to 
entertain contrary theses, receptivity to revision, and so forth. We cannot believe our beliefs 
true unless we think them well supported, and we cannot think that unless we are also 
genuinely committed to all the things that we must be committed to if the belief is to be well 
supported.  Just beneath the surface of our differences, just beneath the terrific differences 
in moral content, is a shared commitment to certain epistemic values that insures the right 
sort of treatment, and so the right sort of attitude, towards our fellow citizens. Talisse 
writes: 
 
Proper regard for the truth leads us to recognize that there is a plurality of defensible 
moral positions. This in turn leads us to see many of those with whom we deeply 
disagree as reasonable and sincere participants in the common moral task of trying 
to do the right thing despite the many hazards and obstacles this task involves. Thus 
the recognition of reasonably pluralism carries with it the same epistemic norms that 
we take ourselves to uphold. That is, a proper recognition of the fact of reasonable 
pluralism not involves respecting the plurality of live options in moral theory among 
reasonable persons, it also calls us to engage our differences…It is precisely because 
the project of reason exchange constantly brings into view the rationality of those 
with whom we disagree that we come to respect and non-repressively tolerate deep 
differences. Put otherwise, it is in the process of exchanging arguments, voicing 
criticisms and responding to objections that we come to see each other as reasoning 
and reasonable agents. (148) 
 
Now to be sure, something further has been introduced in this passage, the idea of 
“reasonable pluralism.” Ever since Socrates pressed Euthyphro about just what it was that 
the gods supposedly “disagreed” about, it has been well acknowledged that moral matters 
are not quite like empirical ones. We would not expect disagreement to persist in the way it 
does if goodness, or justice, or rightness, named empirical facts in the world the nature of 
which could be determined by ordinary investigation. One way to handle the alleged 
problem of ongoing disagreement in moral matters among seeming rational agents (broadly 
understood) is to deny moral judgments have anything to do with truth. This is the 
emotivist’s line, and the existentialist’s. But it is very much not Talisse’s. Indeed, as the 
passage above makes clear, if we were to sever our account of moral judgment from the 
aspiration to truth, from our commitment to truth, then we could not make the particular 
argument that Talisse wants to make, an argument that appeals to what we might call 
epistemic modesty. “Reasonable pluralism” in Talisse’s hands, is the right bracketing 
doctrine here. Because of the way in which moral judgments are formed, it is entirely 
understandable that there be many varieties, even among reasonable people who are 
responsive to all the evidence (see 145, 146). But it is wholly consistent with this story that 
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we, in good faith, regard the doctrines we come to think right in our own case as true. And 
unless we did think our moral convictions true, we would hardly find ourselves in such 
conflict with others.  
 
The point to keep in mind is that such deep divisions exist because of the 
commitment to truth that we share in common. We experience disagreement over 
fundamental matters of religion and morality as conflicts because we are implicitly 
committed to the idea that our own commitments are true…. The problem of deep 
politics [deep evaluative disagreement in political life] arises precisely because we 
are deeply committed not simply to our moral and religious doctrines but to their 
truth. (149, italics Talisse’s) 
 
And so, when we have the right account of moral judgment formation, we have the right 
justification for respectful toleration of differences within a democracy. Moral judgments 
are not like empirical ones in that they will often persist, and understandably so, even 
among reasonable persons responsive to the evidence. But they are like empirical ones in 
that we are committed to holding them only in so far as they can seem to us warranted; only 
if think we have reasons to hold them true. This means our moral convictions must be held 
in a certain way – in a way that reflects epistemic modesty. And this in turn entails the 
political virtues we want to defend too – we should see those with whom we disagree as 
committed to the same search for justification, as offering challenges we must meet, and as 
appropriately challenged by our arguments in turn. It is no criticism of Talisse that society is 
often not this way now – his argument is perfectly suited to the call for the development of 
institutions that would facilitate this view of ourselves, encourage it, make it more real. We 
could after all set up televised debates with strictly enforced rules of order between 
spokespersons on opposing sides of the abortion debate (or austerity policies, or affirmative 
action – the list goes on and on) – and this might go a long way towards enabling the 
partisans of each side to see the doctrine’s of the other in just these terms. It is in our role as 
would be knowers, as seekers of the truth of the matter in political morality, that we can find 
our commonality. The appeal to epistemic norms is substantive; it is not mere pragmatic 
modus vivendi talk. At the same time, it does not beg any political questions, for it is not a 
political doctrine. Hence Talisse can feel, with some pride, that he has escaped the dilemma 
posed by the later Rawls – if we are to see reasonable pluralism as an inevitable, 
inescapable fact of modern political life, it appears then that we cannot appeal to any 
substantive political doctrine in our attempts to handle it. For that is exactly what reasonable 
pluralism denies – the possibility of consensus on substantive doctrines. Yet Talisse has 
appealed to a substantive doctrine, just not a substantive political one.  
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There are several points of possible critical entry here. One might question how much 
remedy a shared commitment to these norms really would deliver. My own view is that it is 
not a bad corrective against some of the more extreme forms of political alienation – I think 
no one can keep these points in mind and go the path of Timothy McVeigh for example; 
that seems sure. Rebellion in its most extreme form would I think be ruled out if you 
thought of your own convictions, and those of your opponents’ along these lines. But I am 
not sure how much purchase it has on more typical, more standard cases of political 
alienation, where we find ourselves living in a community that enforces (through perfectly 
democratic procedures) conceptions far from those that we can endorse. And as a result, I 
am not sure it offers much of an argument against political withdrawal, should this option 
be possible, into a subgroup of the like-minded. If that is to be rejected, (and Talisse very 
much hopes his appeal to epistemic norms can defeat this distinctive threat to our political 
community) I think that will have to be on the basis of a different argument. Connected to 
this is the more mundane point about how “respect for the opinions of others” is perfectly 
compatible with political processes in which those opinions get no final voice. This is a 
point long familiar to us in criticisms of utilitarianism – all may be counted equally going 
into the calculus, but that hardly guarantees the outcome will represent our wishes at all. In 
short, there is just no substitute for substantive agreement, for living among the like-
minded. However, let me be clear: Talisse never denies any of this for a moment. He simply 
thinks that when we do disagree, then recognizing and living by these epistemic norms can 
guide us through the disappointment that follows when we are on the losing end. Let me 
now turn to these norms, and how they play out in our evaluative lives.  
 
Talisse writes a political tract, but he takes a position in meta-ethics to do so. And his meta-
ethics is shaped by his overall commitment to philosophical pragmatism. Moral judgments, 
Talisse thinks, aim at truth. This seems clear enough from the passages quoted above – and 
there are many more along these lines. But being a pragmatist (of the Pierce-ian variety), he 
does not in saying this hold that there are any metaphysical “truthmakers” here. To use the 
language Ronald Dworkin used so well in his parody of this position, there are no 
“morons.” And so, while Talisse is happy to use the language of truth (and how), the 
meaning the term has is always going to be shaped by what we want to say about the 
distinctive domain in which it is deployed. No commitment to some counterpart reality 
necessarily comes along with the use of this term at all. Sure, sometimes this is the right way 
to gloss the term. It may be that in the simple empirical context we can, in speaking this 
way, think of counterpart states of affairs that make our sentences true. (There is a cat on the 
mat all right.) But here, in the world of moral convictions, since there are no “truthmakers,” 
saying that I think my moral view is true, in the end, is going to come very close to 
something like “is warranted,” or “is justified.” One thing is for sure: there is no “moral 
fact” that makes our talk of abortion or affirmative action true or false – not on Talisse’s 
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view (thank goodness). This makes Talisse’s meta-ethical position, on my view, far more 
plausible than the repeated use of all that truth talk might at first lead a reader to think. But 
it also makes the epistemic norms in play here a bit milder than the reader might at first 
think too. And it makes the reach of such norms, or perhaps one might say their 
implications, less substantive too.  
 
Before going further, I think there may be no alternative but to say a little something on the 
much vexed issue of how to think of moral judgments and truth. Here is what I think. We 
can use any language we like – we can speak of our moral judgments as true, or merely as 
warranted, or whatever. The question has to be what we think lies behind such use in a 
given case. And I think in moral life there are essentially two kinds of cases and so two 
kinds of stories. In some cases, we hold a particular view and we do so because, given the 
norms we think right and the facts in play, we think this is the one most warranted. But we 
also acknowledge that different conceptions (perhaps different norms, perhaps different 
weightings of the norms in play) may generate legitimate rivals here. By contrast, there are 
cases where the idea of a “legitimate rival” does not get off the ground. I think affirmative 
action is permissible; I also readily acknowledge there are good, or reasonable, arguments to 
the contrary. (Just read the dissents in the Bakke case if you disagree.) But when I hold 
slavery is wrong, I do not imagine a counterpart justification for the contrary position – not 
a justification that I can find in any way plausible, at least. It is in the second sort of case 
that talk of truth will seem most natural, because here, at least the idea of exclusivity is in 
play. When we feel there is only one good justification story on offer, we get a bit closer to 
the idea of truth as we understand it apart from the evaluative context. When we 
acknowledge (or rightly believe) that there is the possibility of more than one good 
justification story, then, if we speak of the one we affirm as “true” – and we can certainly do 
this if we like – there will always be some strain. I mean, of course, there are ways to fit 
these things together. For example, we could be realists all the same, and hold that “in time” 
the truth about affirmative action or capital punishment or late term abortions will make 
itself known and one justification story will be vindicated, the other cast aside. But if you 
are a pragmatist, (or skeptical towards metaphysical realism before moral life for any 
reason), you are more likely to see talk of “truth” here, (if we must have such talk at all), as 
simply tracking the inner phenomenology. In saying I believe affirmative action permissible 
and I believe this to be true, I am saying something like I could not believe this if I did not 
find the reasons for this view to be the better reasons, if the argument supporting this view 
did not seem to me right, and so forth, No metaphysics is imported; nor is any commitment 
to all other views being something we must call “false.” Talk of truth before our moral 
convictions is simply what falls out of the seriousness with which we take the reasoning 
here combined with the pragmatic point that, in moral life, we can act (or vote) only way 
rather than another.  
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So where does this two tiered story take us when we turn to political conflict, and to 
Talisse’ remedy? Well, if I am right, we will view our opponents somewhat differently in 
the different cases. If we really do believe we are in a case where the opposing view has no 
good justification story at all, then we really do face a crisis. No doubt, this was how the 
issue of slavery appeared (we would now say rightly) to the abolitionists. Their opponents 
were simply wrong, and wrong about something very important; in a case like this, the 
depth of the error made it quite reasonable, perhaps even imperative, to seek a separate 
political community. We cannot imagine an ongoing “dialogue” about this issue with what 
we must see as our “fellow citizens,” where it must also follow that it is always possible 
that, through perfectly democratic processes, this view might from time to time even 
prevail! (The other option, military conquest and forcible coercion had yet to emerge.) 
Perhaps this example is not a problem for Talisse because he can say that he is concerned 
with disputes that are nowhere near so fundamental, with political communities in which the 
basic understandings about equality or fairness have been collectively affirmed and so are 
no longer at issue. OK, maybe – I note in passing that whether a dispute is of this kind can 
sometimes itself be a matter of contention. Animal rights activists (some of them) and 
opponents of late term abortion (some of them) see their opponents in just these terms. But I 
will assume there is a fact of the matter about which disputes really are this way (what 
people happen to think being neither here nor there) and I will further assume that such 
partisans are wrong to characterize the views of their opponents in quite such unforgiving 
terms. Let us assume disputes of this kind are not with us, or are with us so rarely they may 
be set aside.  
 
All right then, what of the more common dispute in political conflict, the clash of 
substantive opposing views, each of which stems from what we must call a minimally 
decent justification story? Surely this is the case that Talisse’s epistemic argument is best 
suited to address? Yes, it is, but I am not sure that we can get all that much from it, so long 
as we are faithful to our distaste for metaphysical moral realism. Let us rehearse the 
problem, and where the epistemic argument is supposed to come in to help. I believe 
conception C strongly and my opponents not-C. Let us assume C and not-C are important, 
not easily set aside (we are not talking about allowing or not allowing zoning changes so the 
nearby car dealership can expand its parking lot). I lose, and I feel alienated from my 
political community. Talisse says: don’t be bewitched by the difference in moral content. 
You and your so-called opponent are in fact similarly engaged in a process of belief 
assessment and formation, similarly committed to assessing the evidence, openness to 
criticism, the possibility of revision, and so forth. Again, this may not be quite as much so 
as we would like, but then what follows is that we ought to make it more so. Forums for 
ongoing discussion and criticism should be set up, and any other mechanisms that bring out 
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the way in which as believers we are alike should be explored. To trace out and assess all 
the possible reformist implications of Talisse’s argument would be a separate essay, but I do 
wish to note in passing that this is a very suggestive strand in the argument. It is easy to 
sneer at these ideas, these descriptions of ourselves, in our culture of Fox news and partisan 
blogs, but we have done almost nothing to see how far we might set up institutions that 
would effectively counter such tendencies. How far we might be different should haunt us 
and Talisse is to be congratulated for at least raising the question. In any event, as I have 
said before, I am going to assume more or less charitable accounts of social causation here – 
let’s assume such ways of interacting with one another are possible and that they are not 
without effect.  
 
Still, because we do not see opposing moral convictions as competing candidates for some 
single truth, we also know that these disagreements may well persist indefinitely; we have 
no reason to think that ongoing exchange will resolve them. Nor does Talisse say otherwise. 
But then it is just not clear why we would not simply prefer to live in a world of C rather 
than not-C if we could – or perhaps more accurately, “to the extent we can.” Choosing 
private schools for their friendliness to creationism and choosing states for their friendliness 
to gun owners expresses just this point. I will assume the choosing parent or gun owner sees 
his opponent in ways consistent with the epistemic norms Talisse extracts from our political 
life. Why not? Let’s be charitable here. But each still, understandably, prefers to live with 
the like-minded. Liberals in America are often shielded from this worry to no small extent 
simply because we live in under a Constitution which enforces distinctive political norms. 
Given the Establishment Clause, and so long as Roe remains good law, the Constitution just 
prevents democratic majorities from enacting policies (on abortion and the place of religion 
in public life for example) that liberals would find very hard to live under – though they 
certainly can, and sometimes do, write essays for the New York Review showing the 
reasonableness of their opponents’ position. The point is this: if we really are going to be 
faithful to our pragmatist anti-realism here, to the absence of any truth-maker, then our 
positions, and our disagreements, must be seen as expressions of conflicting sensibilities. 
We cannot have it both ways: we cannot say there is no fact on the outside that will settle 
this without then also having to admit that what drives the disagreement are facts from the 
inside – how we feel, what we like, in short, our sensibility. And in that case, if the meta-
ethical view I am rehearsing is right, we can quite justifiably simply seek, so much as 
possible, a community of the like-minded rather than persist in ongoing exchange. We 
cannot believe the view needs further exchange in order to be even better supported. That is 
true only to the extent the view relies on evidence or considerations that may be thought of 
as separate from the view-holder. To be sure, “that extent” is not nothing – there is a great 
deal of responsiveness to evidence that must be undertaken before one reaches the point I 
am referring to here. But reach it one eventually does. And then our disagreements are not 
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unlike the differences we find in aesthetic sensibility. There is no point, past a point, in any 
further exchange between the abstract expressionist and the figurative artist – no point that 
is in making the views each holds any better justified. And each would be perfectly entitled, 
at that point, to quit the debate and simply pursue their aesthetic vision among the like-
minded.    
 
But having said that, I want to say that there may in fact be a somewhat different point in 
the background here that will do much of the work Talisse wants. I have argued that our 
commitment to a good epistemology, to the right epistemic norms, does not require ongoing 
exchange with our opponents when the dispute is not one we can think of determined by 
some external truth-maker. It is not the epistemology or respect for the content of the views 
that warrants ongoing exchange. But something else does. I think there is a Kantian idea 
here, one also in play in On Liberty (of course) of respecting the person, and showing a kind 
of attention or concern for the other simply in listening. Talisse is right to worry about how 
in politics today, the like-minded tend not only to move their convictions into ever more 
extreme territory; they also tend to see their opponents as fools. And this is an attitude that, 
as a matter of fact, we combat very effectively simply through the right sort of interaction. 
Our common humanity becomes more vivid to us if we act (or interact) in ways that bring it 
to the fore. By listening to others and trying to reply to them, by their doing the same to us, 
they become more human, more like us, less easily objects of derision or contempt. When 
opponents treat each other with respect, their views may not become any closer, but a desire 
to live more harmoniously with one another certainly takes root. The appeal to 
epistemology and epistemic norms may be a bit of a Trojan horse here. The real remedy is a 
different causal force, the beneficent, humanizing effects of exchange itself. I do not think 
we can always say that we need exchange in order to improve our arguments. Sometimes 
this is so, but it is not always so. When we talk to others about why we believe what we do, 
and listen to their stories along the same lines, we become closer, less alienated from one 
another, this is surely true. But this is not because of a common commitment to a common 
moral epistemology, a common interest in the truth (however that is understood in moral 
matters). It is I think for more Humean reasons. We are (luckily) hard wired to see others as 
not so different from ourselves, and to feel varying degrees of empathy and sympathy when 
brought up close to the reasoning and affective story that operates in another’s case. We are 
often motivated to modify our views, not because we have come to think the justification 
story warrants it, but simply because, through interaction, we become motivated to 
cooperate. Talisse I think has prescribed medicine we should certainly take, or take more of. 
But I do not think the justification for this medicine is quite what he thinks it is. I do not see 
how it can be for the anti-realist along Talisse like lines. But that does not mean there is not 
another justification story lying elsewhere, very close at hand. 
